Files
act_runner/act
Christian Heim b7f6b6d90a fix: composite nested uses clone token (#1041)
## Summary

A nested `uses:` action inside a **local composite action** fails to clone with a bare `authentication required: Unauthorized` (401) when the instance resolves host-less action references against itself (`DEFAULT_ACTIONS_URL = self`). The job fails at the composite **main→post boundary**, even though the composite's own steps and all post-steps report success.

## Root cause

`newCompositeRunContext` nils `Config.Secrets` so composite steps do not see job secrets. But the action-clone path in `prepareActionExecutor` sourced its token via `getGitCloneToken` → `Config.GetToken()` → `Config.Secrets`, which is empty inside a composite RunContext. The nested action is therefore cloned anonymously → 401 against the authenticated instance.

Two details explain the exact symptom:

- It surfaces at the composite **main→post boundary** because the swallowed nested-step error is re-emitted by `common.JobError` at the end of the composite main pipeline.
- It carries **no clone URL** because, on a warm action cache, only `r.Fetch` runs (not `PlainClone`), and the go-git fetch error is returned verbatim.

## Fix

Source the clone token from `github.Token` instead of `Config.Secrets`. It is preserved across the composite config copy (`Config.Token` / `PresetGitHubContext`) and is identical to `Config.GetToken()` at the top level, so top-level and `act exec` behaviour is unchanged. The `shouldCloneURLUseToken` host gate is kept so the token is never sent to a foreign host. This also aligns the git-clone path with the ActionCache fetch path, which already uses `github.Token`.

Reusable workflows are unaffected — their RunContext keeps `Config.Secrets`.

## Before / after

Local composite action with a nested `uses:` (+ post step), followed by a marker step. Same workflow, same runner host — only the runner fix differs.

| Job step | Before fix | After fix |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `Run actions/checkout@v6` |  success |  success |
| `Run ./.gitea/actions/probe-composite` (nested `uses:` + post) |  **failure** — bare 401 at the main→post boundary |  success |
| `Step after composite` | ⊘ **skipped** |  **ran** |
| Job result |  **failed** |  **succeeded** |

### Before — boundary log

```text
::endgroup::
##[error]authentication required: Unauthorized   ← bare 401, no clone target
Run Post ./.gitea/actions/probe-composite
Success - Post ./.gitea/actions/probe-composite  ← post steps run and succeed
Success - Post actions/checkout@v6
Job failed
```

The composite's own steps and both post-steps report `Success`; the job fails solely on the bare 401 emitted at the main→post boundary, and the next step is skipped.

### After — boundary log

```text
Run ./.gitea/actions/probe-composite
  ...composite steps...
Success - ./.gitea/actions/probe-composite
Run Marker after composite
PASSED composite boundary — no 401 (runner fix confirmed)
Success - Marker after composite
Job succeeded
```

## Reproduction

`.gitea/actions/probe-composite/action.yml`:

```yaml
name: probe-composite
runs:
  using: composite
  steps:
    - uses: actions/setup-node@v6   # nested uses → has a post step
      with: { node-version: 22 }
    - run: echo "composite inner step OK"
      shell: bash
```

`.gitea/workflows/probe.yaml`:

```yaml
on: [push]
jobs:
  composite-boundary:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
      - uses: ./.gitea/actions/probe-composite
      - run: echo "step after composite"   # skipped before the fix; runs after
```

## Verification

- **Before:** bare 401 at the boundary, reproduced with a `delay=0` tail — rules out a token-TTL / expiry effect; it is a missing credential.
- **After:** the composite step succeeds, the step after the composite runs, the job succeeds, and there is no `authentication required` in the log.
- A reusable workflow (`workflow_call`) with the same nested `uses:` + post step never hit the 401, which isolated the bug to the composite main/post path.

## Tests

Adds `TestStepActionRemoteCloneTokenSurvivesNilSecrets` (`act/runner`): asserts the clone token is forwarded when the RunContext mirrors a composite (`Secrets == nil`, token via `Config.Token`), and that the host gate still withholds the token for a foreign host. Verified to fail without the fix and pass with it.

---------

Reviewed-on: https://gitea.com/gitea/runner/pulls/1041
Reviewed-by: Zettat123 <39446+zettat123@noreply.gitea.com>
Co-authored-by: Christian Heim <christian@heimdaheim.de>
Co-committed-by: Christian Heim <christian@heimdaheim.de>
2026-06-29 06:23:54 +00:00
..
2026-04-22 22:29:06 +02:00